Lawlessness and Economics: Alternative Modes of Governance by Avinash K. Dixit
COPYRIGHT NOTICE:
For COURSE PACK and other PERMISSIONS, refer to entry on previous page. For
more information, send e-mail to permissions@pupress.princeton.edu
University Press. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form
by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information 
storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from the publisher, except for reading 
and browsing via the World Wide Web. Users are not permitted to mount this file on any 
network servers.
is published by Princeton University Press and copyrighted, © 2004, by Princeton
Avinash K. Dixit: Lawlessness and Economics1
Economics With and Without the Law
1.1 The Need for Economic Governance
Most economic activities and interactions share several properties that together
createtheneedforaninstitutionalinfrastructureofgovernance. First,theseactivities
and interactions are opportunities to create or add value. This includes creation of
tangible or intangible property (such as improved land, physical and human capital,
reputation,andgoodwill)andexchangeofgoodsandservices. Second,theactivities
require input from several individuals. We have known since the birth of economics
how division of labor enhances productivity; more recently, we have recognized
the importance of creation and preservation of common property resources. Third,
the interactions are based on explicit or implicit contracts voluntarily made by all
the parties involved; exchanges of a good or service for another good or service or
money are the main instances of this. Some actions may be unilaterally undertaken
by one party but create costs or beneﬁts for another; examples include accidental




that increase his own gain, while lowering the others’gain by a greater amount. The
onlyexceptionsaresituationsinvolvingsimultaneousexchangeofgoodsorservices
of immediately veriﬁable attributes and qualities, but these are a small subset of all
economic interactions. In most situations, the participants have opportunities to
supply defective goods, shirk on the job, renege on payment, and so on. Williamson
(1979, 1985) has coined the term “opportunism” for this whole class of actions that
tempt individuals but hurt the group as a whole.
Problems also arise with property rights. If no mechanisms—governmental or




and Kim (1985), and others have focused on these problems.2 1. Economics With and Without the Law
Anticipation of opportunism, theft, or extortion constitutes a strong disincen-
tive to making potentially valuable investments or entering into mutually beneﬁcial
contracts in the ﬁrst place. Therefore if market economies are to succeed, they
need a foundation of mechanisms to deter such privately proﬁtable but socially dys-
functional behaviors, and thereby to sustain adequate incentives to invest, produce,
and exchange. In other words, markets need the underpinning of institutions of
economic governance.
1.2 Economics Taking the Law for Granted
Economists have always recognized the need for governance. However, until rel-
atively recently they assumed that the government, speciﬁcally the institution and
machinery of the state’s law, provided the needed governance. Criminal law, while
it has major non-economic functions, also serves to deter theft and some forms of
economic fraud. Civil law has economic aspects centrally in its concerns. Contract
lawcanbesaidtobemainlyforthegovernanceofeconomicactivity;lawsoftortand
liability pertain to contracts as well as non-contractual relationships, both mainly in
the economic sphere.
Even the most libertarian economists, who deny the government any useful role
inmostaspectsoftheeconomy,allowthatmakingandenforcinglawsthatgiveclear
deﬁnitionsofpropertyrights, andensuringadherencetovoluntaryprivatecontracts,
are legitimate and indeed essential functions of government, in addition to national
defense. Friedman (1962, p. 2) puts this succinctly:
[The government’s] major functions must be to protect our freedom
both from the enemies outside our gates and from our fellow-citizens:
to preserve law and order, to enforce private contracts, to foster com-
petitive markets.
There seems universal agreement in traditional economics that the framework of
law is a necessary condition for a market economy to succeed.
Extreme libertarians regard the government’s legal framework as not only nec-
essary but also sufﬁcient for markets to function well—the Coase Theorem (Coase
1960, 1988) says that if property rights are well deﬁned, voluntary contracts can
achieveallavailableeconomicbeneﬁts,includingtheinternalizationofexternalities
and the provision of public goods. Most other economists recognize the possibility
of market failure even under the aegis of a well-functioning state law; for them,
institutions of law are not a sufﬁcient condition to ensure optimal outcomes from
markets. Forexample, McMillan(2002, pp.ix,x)liststhreeotherelementsformar-
ketstoworkwell: “informationﬂowssmoothly, ..., side-effectsonthirdpartiesare
curtailed, and competition is fostered.” The opposites of these, namely imperfect
information, externalities, and imperfect competition, are well-recognized causes1.2. Economics Taking the Law for Granted 3
of market failure, and they can exist regardless of whether a government adequately
protects property rights and enforces contracts.
Thus conventional economic theory does not underestimate the importance of
law; rather, the problem is that it takes the existence of a well-functioning insti-
tution of state law for granted. It assumes that the state has a monopoly over the
use of coercion, and that the state designs and enforces laws with the objective
of maximizing social welfare. Moreover, until the last 30 years or so, that is,
until economics recognized the ubiquity and importance of information asymme-
tries and transaction costs, the usual implicit assumption was that the law operated
costlessly.1
This simple view of the law made it possible to achieve faster progress in the
research on the economic forces of supply and demand, and of their equilibration in
markets; therefore it was a useful abstraction in its time. However, its shortcomings
soon hinder rather than help the economic analysis of markets and limit its useful-
ness. Only advanced countries in recent times come anywhere near the economist’s
ideal picture, in which the government supplies legal institutions that are guided
solelybyconcernforsocialwelfareandoperateatlowcost. Inallcountriesthrough
much of their history, the apparatus of state law was very costly, slow, unreliable,
biased,corrupt,weak,orsimplyabsent. Inmostcountriesthissituationstillprevails.
Markets with such weak underpinnings of law differ greatly from those depicted in
conventional economic theory.
Deﬁciencies of the law are most acute in less-developed countries (LDCs) and in
transition economies. For example, Bearak (2000) reports that there are 25 million
cases pending before the courts in India, and even if no new ones are ﬁled, it will
take 324 years to clear the backlog. Murrell (1996, p. 34) found that laws in many
transition economies were “a facade without a foundation.” Recent assessments of
the effectiveness of the legal system in post-Soviet Russia differ among Western
observers, but a fair assessment is that while the Arbitrazh court system created to
handle commercial disputes has begun to function reasonably well in handing down
verdicts, getting these verdicts enforced remains highly problematic, especially for
smaller enterprises (Hendley and Murrell 2001; Hay and Shleifer 1998). McMillan
and Woodruff (1999, 2000) and others have found similar situations in other tran-
sition economies in Eastern Europe and in Vietnam. Djankov and Murrell (2002)
survey this literature.
Of course economic activity does not grind to a halt because the government
cannot or does not provide an adequate underpinning of law. Too much potential
value would go unrealized; therefore groups and societies have much to gain if they
can create alternative institutions to provide the necessary economic governance.
1Barzel (2002, especially Chapters 1 and 2) criticizes the orthodox economic view of the state as a
benevolent and costless monopolist in coercion.4 1. Economics With and Without the Law
They attempt to develop, and sometimes succeed in developing, such institutions
of varying degrees of effectiveness. These include self-protection or hired profes-
sional protection for property rights (see, for example, Hirshleifer 2001; Gambetta
1993), networks of information transmission, and social norms and punishments
for contract enforcement (see, for example, Greif 1993, 1994; Milgrom, North, and
Weingast 1990; Gambetta 1993). Indeed, an extreme version of the CoaseTheorem
saysthateverythingworksoutinthebestfeasibleway(Stigler1988). Ifgovernance
is costly, the least-cost method will get chosen from among the available institu-
tions, whether it be state law or a private alternative. In this view, the emergence
of a state or government is itself endogenous, and will occur if, and only if, it is
the most efﬁcient mode of governance. But even without going that far, we can
recognize that societies will attempt to evolve other institutions, albeit imperfect
ones, to underpin their economic activity when state law is missing or unusable. In
other words, governmental provision of legal institutions is not strictly necessary
for achieving reasonably good outcomes from markets.
Rodrik (2003, pp. 10–16) summarizes the lessons of case studies of several coun-
tries as follows.
Institutions that provide dependable property rights, manage conﬂict,
maintain law and order, and align economic incentives with social
costs and beneﬁts are the foundation of long-term growth. ... State
institutions are not the only ones that matter. Social arrangements
can have equally important and lasting consequences. ... Modest
changes in institutional arrangements ... can produce large growth
payoffs ... [but] the required changes can be highly speciﬁc to the
context.
This yields some general lessons for policy-makers in LDCs and transition econ-
omies who are contemplating market-oriented reforms and privatizations, and for
their economic advisers from Western countries and international organizations.
They must recognize that markets will not succeed unless they are supported by
adequate governance institutions. The processes of creating the institutions and
the apparatus of state law, and of improving them to the point where they func-
tion well, are slow and costly. But it is not always necessary to create replicas of
Western-style state legal institutions from scratch; it may be possible to work with
such alternative institutions as are available, and build on them. Of course, to do
this we must have a good understanding of how various institutions of governance
work, and of how they interact with each other and with an imperfect state law
where that exists. My aim in this book is to contribute to the improvement of this
understanding.1.3. “Lawlessness and Economics” in Context 5
1.3 “Lawlessness and Economics” in Context
Where does the study of alternative institutions for protection of property rights
and enforcement of contracts, to which I have given the eye-catching albeit strictly
inaccurate title “Lawlessness and Economics,” stand in relation to many closely
relatedﬁeldsofinquiry? Suchdemarcationofﬁeldsorsubﬁeldsisalwaysadifﬁcult
question. Realityisusuallyacomplexmixture, whereastheoreticalanalysisusually
proceeds faster and goes deeper by identifying pure conceptual categories. In the
present context, all countries have governments of some kind, of varying scope,
competence,andbenevolence. Andinallofthem,signiﬁcantaspectsorcomponents
ofeconomicactivityareconductedwithoutdirectreferenceorrecoursetothestate’s
law. Isolating pure categories from this reality is a matter of judgment, and any
attemptataprecisedeﬁnitionordelineationleavessigniﬁcantexceptionsoroverlaps.
But an attempt must be made, however imperfect, so that researchers and students
in neighboring areas can ﬁt this book into the context of their own work.
Lawlessness and Economics can be regarded as a subﬁeld within the broad con-
ceptual framework of the New Institutional Economics. This large and varied body
of research has built upon pioneering ideas of Coase (1937, 1960, 1988), North
(1990), Williamson (1985, 1996), and others; Williamson (2000) has given us a
good recent overview and assessment.
North distinguishes between institutions and organizations. For him, institutions
are the overarching framework of rules and constraints, formal and informal, that
governinteractionsamongindividuals;constitutionsandsocialnormsareexamples.
Organizations are groups of individuals that operate within the general framework
of institutions, and implement the rules and norms of the institutions; examples
are legislatures, political parties, and universities. Of course there are interactions
and feedbacks between institutions and organizations. The rules and constraints
imposed by institutions do not eliminate all freedom for organizations to act, and
since organizations have members with differing interests and abilities, interesting
issues of “the play of the game” at this level must be analyzed. Institutions can then
evolve to alter the rules of the game so as to achieve better outcomes from the play
at the organizational level. Finally, individuals interact within the frameworks set
up by both institutions and organizations, and these transactions have their costs of
information, commitment, and so on. North (1990, pp. 92–104) argues that institu-
tions and organizations attempt to economize on transaction costs, but usually fall
short of optimality, especially when changing economic and technological condi-
tions require changed or new institutions. He gives two categories of reasons for
the long lags and bottlenecks in the process of institutional change: ﬁrst, resistance
by powerful special interests with stakes in the old system; and second, multiple
equilibria and historical accidents.6 1. Economics With and Without the Law
Othersusethesametermsinslightlydifferentsensesanddrawsomewhatdifferent
distinctions. Forexample,inhispioneeringgame-theoreticanalysis,Schotter(1981,
p. 11) deﬁnes institutions as
aregularityinsocialbehaviorthatisagreedtobyallmembersofsociety,
speciﬁes behavior in speciﬁc recurrent situations, and is either self-
policed or policed by some external authority.
Thus his institutions specify the strategies that the individuals should choose. That
is,theyincludeaspectsoftheplayofthegameaswellastherules. Calvert(1995a,b)
develops this idea further, and interprets it more explicitly as specifying the equi-
librium that is to be played. Sobel (2002, p. 147) similarly says that
an individual’s expectation of the response to his action is often an
important part of the institutional environment; that is, the institutional
environment also serves to coordinate beliefs and select equilibria.
And Greif (2000) deﬁnes institutions as
a system of social factors—such as rules, beliefs, norms, and organiza-
tions—that guide, enable, and constrain the actions of individuals.
Thusheincludesorganizationsasanexampleofinstitutions,notaseparatecategory.
Moreover,thebeliefsinhisanalysisarebeliefsaboutthestrategiesthatotherswould
choose in off-equilibrium situations, and therefore serve to select an equilibrium;
this accords with Calvert’s view of institutions. I conclude that North’s conceptual
distinction between the rules and the play of the game, leading to the distinction
between institutions and organizations, serves a useful purpose of focusing our
attention on the different functions, but there are many feedbacks between the two
categories blurring the distinction.
Williamson(2000)drawsﬁnerdistinctionswithafour-levelclassiﬁcationscheme.
At the ﬁrst (highest or most basic) level stand informal institutions, such as religion,
socialcustomsandnorms. Theseareslowtochange, overthetimescaleofcenturies
or millennia. At the second level is the institutional environment, consisting of
formal rules, such as constitutions and laws. The timescale of evolution of these is
measuredindecades. Theplayofthegameoccursatthethirdlevel,andthisincludes
the choice of appropriate modes of governance for each type of transaction, or
organizationsinNorth’ssense,theaimbeingtoeconomizeontransactioncosts. The
idea that transactions and governance modes are aligned in this way isWilliamson’s
(1996, p. 12) famous discriminating alignment hypothesis. Finally, the fourth and
lowest level contains routine economic activities such as production, employment,
market equilibration.
Williamson places other subﬁelds within this scheme. Positive Political Theory
(PPT) operates mostly at the second level, focusing on political institutions such as1.3. “Lawlessness and Economics” in Context 7
the executive and the legislature, and their implications for economic performance.
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) is located mostly at the third level. It focuses
on economic structures such as ﬁrms and on transactions within and across these
structures. It studies how the economic structures and transactions respond to the
available governance structures and their limitations.
As with all attempts at taxonomy, this leaves some ambiguities and overlaps,
and is not universally followed. Most importantly, some other people would locate
many informal institutions of social norms at the second rather than the ﬁrst level.
For Williamson, norms and other informal institutions have “mainly spontaneous
origins”and“havealastinggriponthewayasocietyconductsitself”(2000,p.597).
Inmyopinionthisistrueofsomebutnotallnorms. Societiesmakeconsciousefforts
to instill some norms into their members, enlisting the help of parents, teachers,
media, and leaders of opinion for this purpose. Many of the norms pertain to civic
dutiessuchasvoting,butotherspertaintohonestyineconomicmatters. Thisprocess
of social conditioning and education can respond to changing needs much faster
than the evolutionary timescale. Many of the communities facing collective-action
problems that were the subject of Ostrom’s (1990) studies created and used such
norms. Therefore I will be more ﬂexible in the location of norms in Williamson’s
scheme. Next, there are important feedbacks from level 3 to level 2, therefore they
should be studied jointly.
Where does LLE ﬁt within Williamson’s classiﬁcation? In one sense, it is about
what PPT leaves out. LLE asks: if the government’s apparatus is absent from the
institutional environment of level 2, what takes its place and provides the rules
of the game? There is another difference between LLE and PPT. In its relation
to economics, PPT is interested in more macro aspects of economic policy and
how these are affected by political institutions, for example, how ﬁscal, monetary,
regulatory, and trade policies differ between presidential and parliamentary systems
(PerssonandTabellini2000). ThefocusofLLEisonthemuchmoremicroeconomic
level of individual transactions. At level 3, LLE shares many concerns with TCE,
but it is focused more on the interaction among distinct decision units than on
governance within one ﬁrm. However, this distinction is not at all clear-cut, as the
boundariesofdecisionunitsarethemselvesendogenousandcanchangeinresponse
to changes in transaction technologies and enforcement modes.
Thus the concept of institutions in the New Institutional Economics is somewhat
imprecise, and is interpreted differently by different scholars. In my view this is not
a serious defect. It is not so important to have a deﬁnition that would be valid and
rigidly enforced in all contexts; what matters is that we understand what it means
in any speciﬁc context we are analyzing.
Next I discuss the relationship between LLE and another large and growing ﬁeld,
variouslylabeled“InstitutionsandGrowth”or“InstitutionsandDevelopment.” This8 1. Economics With and Without the Law
ﬁeldstudieshowtheinstitutionsandorganizationsthatmakeandimplementgovern-
ment policy affect economic performance, and attempts to identify what constitutes
good governance in this sense. The literature is vast and wide-ranging. Pioneering
historical and conceptual perspectives such as North (1990) and Olson (1993) have
taught us the importance of securing property rights, especially against the govern-
ment’s own predation. Case studies of De Soto (1989, 2000), the compilation of
analytical case studies in Rodrik (2003) (and many other case studies), the theoret-
ical modeling of Grossman (2002) and others, and the combination of theory and
empirical observation by Shleifer and Vishny (1998), all reinforce this message.
Construction of quantitative indexes of good governance is an active enterprise;
a recent example is Kaufman, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2003). Much empirical work
has established positive correlations across countries between various measures of
economic performance and various aspects of good governance such as the rule
of law in deﬁning and protecting property rights, accountability of policymakers,
transparency of policy, lack of corruption, and simplicity and speed of bureau-
cratic procedures. Examples are Hall and Jones (1999), Sokoloff and Engerman
(2000), La Porta et al (1998, 1999), Rodrik (2000),Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robin-
son (2001), Acemoglu et al (2002), and Kaufman and Kraay (2002). Of course
the positive feedback may indicate reverse causation—the demand for good gover-
nance rises with incomes—or common effects of third variables on both. Empirical
researchers handle this problem using different instrumental variables that are not
affected by current economic performance, for example colonial origin (Hall and
Jones), historical measures of morality (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson), and
an instrumental variable estimation of reverse causation plus direct knowledge of
measurement errors to achieve identiﬁcation (Kaufman and Kraay). In fact Kauf-
man and Kraay ﬁnd a negative reverse causation: across countries, higher incomes
on average lead to worse governance. This may be because in a country with higher
income, especially if the income derives from natural-resource extraction, there is
more rent-seeking and greater likelihood of capture of government and policymak-
ing(seeTornellandLane1998). However, SachsandWarner(2001, p.836)present
evidence to the contrary. Overall, the empirical literature gives good support to the
proposition that good governance causes higher incomes and growth.




growth or development. One can think of LLE as a potential microfoundation for
theories of how governance institutions affect macroeconomic performance. Sec-
ondly,LLEinitspurestformassumesthatthegovernment’slawiscompletelyabsent
or ineffective, and examines purely non-governmental alternatives that attempt to1.4. Law and Economics 9
perform some of the same functions; therefore the quality of government is not
directly an issue. In most of the formal models I develop in this book I focus on
this part of LLE, and do not examine in any detail the situation where the govern-
ment itself is predatory or kleptocratic. This is because I believe that a thorough
theoretical analysis of the pure case of non-state economic governance constitutes
a useful start for further research on the interactions between corrupt or predatory
governments and private institutions of governance. In Chapter 2, I do consider
interactions between private arrangements that can use better inside information on
the one hand, and a state law that must use worse public information on the other.
However, the state in that chapter is assumed to be neither corrupt nor predatory.
Predation by the state or its agents has been the essence of the problem in many
countries and in the literature on the quality of government, and a start at theoret-
ical thinking has been made, for example by Shleifer and Vishny (1998), Hay and
Shleifer (1998), and Grossman (1995, 2002). I make one contribution to this line of
research: in Section 5.4 I reinterpret standard theories of optimal income taxation
to obtain some characterization of the interaction between a predatory government,
and citizens trying their best to evade its attempts to take their assets and outputs.
Furtheranalysisofpredatorygovernmentsshouldbeanimportantpartoftheagenda
for future theoretical research in LLE.
I hope this discussion of what LLE does and does not attempt will help readers
locatemytopicinrelationwithotherﬁeldsandsubﬁelds. However,theunavoidable
ambiguities of taxonomy require that such boundaries should be permeable. In this
chapter I will indulge in a few more attempts at deﬁnition and demarcation. But
then, for the rest of the book, I will proceed without any consistent attempt to stay
strictly within those conﬁnes.
1.4 Law and Economics
The ﬁeld of Law and Economics became established during the 1960s and 1970s,
and continues to grow. It studies the interaction between state law and economic
activities and outcomes. Thus “Law and Economics” and “Lawlessness and Eco-
nomics” can be regarded as two mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive subﬁelds
of the larger ﬁeld of economic governance; of course in reality there are overlaps
and omissions. In this section I mention some of the major concerns of Law and
Economics to bring out the contrasts, but do not go into any of them in any detail,
merely referring interested readers to Posner and Parisi (1997). This three-volume
handbook contains many of the important articles on Law and Economics, along
with detailed editorial commentary.
The early contributions to Law and Economics mostly dealt with the implica-
tions of law for economics, that is, they considered the effect of legal rules on the
economic choices of individuals and ﬁrms and on market outcomes. To quote from10 1. Economics With and Without the Law
the survey by Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989, p. 1068), this theory “treats laws, like
prices, as incentives for behavior.” This work encompassed both criminal and civil
laws. Becker’s (1968) article on the optimal detection and punishment strategies to
deter crime has become classic. Modern theory has added information- and game-
theoretic aspects to the analysis. Polinsky and Shavell (2000) survey this literature.
Various branches of civil law—liability, tort, contract, property—govern situations
where two or more individuals can enter into a contractual relationship, explicit or
implicit, as well as ones where one person’s actions have spillover effects on others
withoutanyvoluntaryagreementontheirside. Theselegalrulesaffecttheincentives
of individuals to take actions, or to refrain from actions, that carry beneﬁts or costs
to others, and that in turn affect overall economic outcomes and efﬁciency. Baird,
Gertner, and Picker (1994) discuss many examples of this kind in the course of their
exposition of game theory.
Later work took up a reverse causation from economics to law and jurisprudence,
namely evaluation of alternative legal rules in the light of the economic concepts of
efﬁciency. This led to issues of design or reform of speciﬁc legal rules, and even
the concept of the law as a system that can be designed, rather than as a collection
of cases and precedents to be studied and applied. Posner (2002) examines the law
in this way from an economist’s perspective.
1.5 Economics in the Shadow of the Law
Even in modern countries where a well-functioning institution and apparatus of




this idea goes back at least as far as Macaulay (1963). Williamson (1996, pp. 10,
122), citing previous legal scholars, says that businessmen “speak of ‘cancelling
the order’rather than ‘breaching our contract’,” and that contracts and courts are “a
norm of ultimate appeal when the relations cease in fact to work.” In matters of
personal relationships, too, Mnookin and Kornhauser (1979) cite estimates that less
than 10% of divorces are contested in court. All of this has led to the concept of
“private ordering in the shadow of the law.”
An obvious explanation for the persistence of such private ordering is that resolu-
tion of disputes using the formal machinery of state law is far from costless; in fact
its costs, especially time costs, often exceed those of alternative methods of private
ordering. Sometimes formal law may yield outcomes that are worse for all parties
than can private ordering. Therefore the outcome that the parties expect to obtain in
the court (net of the costs of using the court system) becomes a backstop or threat1.5. Economics in the Shadow of the Law 11
point to private negotiation. I will sketch this idea in somewhat greater detail in
Section 2.2.
Long-term relationships and arbitration are the most common modes of private
ordering. Long-term relationships can be self-enforcing for reasons familiar from
the theory of repeated games: the immediate gains from behaving opportunistically
can be offset by future losses, because the opportunism leads to a collapse of the
relationship and therefore to lower future payoffs. But now we have another pos-
sibility. The relationship need not collapse completely; it can be replaced by one
based on formal contracts and court enforcement. This is still costly and therefore
servestodeteropportunismintheoriginalongoingrelationship. Butthecostmaybe
less than that of a total breakdown of interaction. Correspondingly, the deterrence
effect falls short of the level possible when total breakdown is the only alternative.
Thus availability of court enforcement may, in a seeming paradox, reduce the extent
of good behavior that can be sustained in the long-term relationship. I will examine
this possibility in Section 2.3.
Theofﬁciallawcaninterferewithalong-termrelationshipinanotherway,namely
by agreeing to hear a case ﬁled by one of the parties in such a relationship attempt-
ing to overturn an adverse outcome in the implicit contract. However, courts often
recognize the merits of implicit contracting in long-term relationships like employ-
ment, andrefusetohearsuchcases. Thisisthedoctrineofforbearance(Williamson
1996, p. 27).
Private arbitration can have cost advantages over the government’s courts, but
perhaps more importantly, it can have information advantages and therefore pro-
vide dispute resolution of higher quality. Arbitration forums specialize by industry,
geographic region, and so on, in the range of disputes they take up. They acquire
expertiseintheirspecialareas. Theycanadoptproceduresandrulesofevidencethat
suittheirspeciﬁcconcerns. Statecourtsmuststandreadytoconsiderallmattersthat
could arise under the law, and although some attempt can be made to assign cases
to judges on the basis of their expertise, the rules and procedures must remain the
same for all cases. For these reasons, arbitrators are better able to obtain, interpret,
and use information pertinent to the dispute than are the state courts. I will develop
a model of such informational advantage in Section 2.4.
Arbitratorslackthecoercivepowersofthestateandthereforecannotensurecom-
pliance with their verdicts. But, as with long-term relationships, the government’s
courts often recognize the advantages of arbitration for governance of particular
classes of transactions. Then they accept the arbitrator’s verdict and will not agree
to rehear the issue. This is formalized in US laws (Bernstein 2001, footnote 111)
and in international agreements (Mattli 2001, p. 939). Given this shadow of the law,
if one party refuses to comply with the arbitrator’s verdict, the other can enlist the
help of the courts for enforcement.12 1. Economics With and Without the Law
Landes and Posner (1979) describe and analyze private institutions of adjudica-
tion historically as well as in the context of modern states. Milgrom, North, and
Weingast (1990) describe a speciﬁc historical institution, namely the lex mercatoria
or merchants’ law, usually called “the law merchant,” in medieval Europe. They
and others ﬁnd that many principles developed by the private judges or adjudicators
of the law merchant were later taken over by the state’s law. However, Landes and
Posner point out that private adjudicators lack the incentives to supply the “public
good” of principles and precedents, so we expect it to be underprovided.
1.6 Other Institutions of Economic Governance
Let us turn to an extreme conceptual situation that is the true realm of Lawless-
ness and Economics, namely an economy lacking any government-provided legal
institutions or organizations for protection of property rights and enforcement of
contracts. Such a society needs to develop its own alternative modes of economic
governance. Two general types of such institutions and organizations are observed.
They are parallel to the long-term relationships and arbitration forums mentioned in
theprevioussection, butheretheprivateorderingmustoperateunsheltered, without
the shadow of the law.
Thealternativethathasbeenstudiedmostthoroughlyisself-enforcinggovernance
through repeated interaction. If the same parties interact with each other repeatedly,
and they value the future sufﬁciently highly relative to the present, then the prospect
of a long-term collapse of the relationship can control the temptation to obtain a
short-term gain. This is well understood, both in the theory of repeated games and
in practice (Axelrod 1984; Abreu 1986; Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti 1990; and
severalothers). Butmanyeconomicactivitiesrequiredealingwithdifferentpartners
at different times. Even bilateral relationships may get severed, requiring one or
both parties to ﬁnd a different partner in the future. Therefore we must consider
situationswherethereislittlelong-termrelationshipwiththesameperson,butstable
membership of a whole large group. Self-governance in such a group requires that
if any one person cheats his current partner, the news is conveyed to others in the
group who might be the cheater’s future partners. This loss of reputation can lead
to ostracization, or other actions by the group that have the effect of punishing the
cheater on behalf of his current victim. In turn, such reputational considerations
can deter opportunistic behavior. For this process to work, the society needs good
information networks and credible multilateral punishment strategies.
Both of these conditions can be fulﬁlled in stable and cohesive groups or net-
works, which might be deﬁned by business ties (Greif 1993; Bernstein 1992, 2001),
ethnicity (Casella and Rauch 2002; Rauch 2001), and so on. However, the quality
of information and the credibility of punishment both degrade as the size of such a
group increases. The case studies of Ostrom (1990) and the contrasting case studies1.6. Other Institutions of Economic Governance 13
of two merchant groups by Greif (1994, 1997) illustrate this vividly, and numer-
ical calculations on the theoretical models of Kandori (1993) and Ellison (1994)
show similar tendencies. Therefore we need a better understanding of the limits of
self-governance. What happens if trading opportunities expand beyond the close
group? When does some other mode of governance become better? What happens
at the interface between the two systems? I will tackle some of these questions in
Chapter 3.
Instead of relying on self-governance, the group might attempt to obtain the
serviceforafeefromaprivateindividualorgroup. Onecanthinkofthisasa“private
government,” established to serve just this one function, as opposed to the broader
institutionwecallthegovernment,whichperformsamultitudeoffunctions. Credit-
rating agencies and similar certiﬁcation intermediaries can collect and disseminate
informationaboutaperson’shistorytohisprospectivepartner. Arbitrationisanother
common arrangement of this kind. In the absence of state law, it cannot rely on the
courts’ forbearance to ensure compliance with its verdicts. But arbitration can
use repeated interactions in the group. Thus, if any member of the group deﬁes
the arbitrator’s ruling, the arbitrator can publicize this information to the whole
group, and then the group will not deal with the miscreant. In effect, the arbitrator
becomes the hub of an information network. The private judges at trade fairs in
medieval Europe functioned in this way (Milgrom, North, and Weingast 1990);
Bernstein (1992, 2001) gives examples of modern trade associations that provide
similar functions for their members.
Finally, organized crime provides services of information as well as enforcement
(Gambetta 1993; Varese 2000; Whiting 1999; and others). In a society without
state law, there is no external mechanism to ensure honesty of the arbitrator, the
private judge, or the maﬁoso. That has to be self-enforcing, based on reputation
considerations in a long-term relationship. Even though the participants in the
economic transactions may not meet the same partners repeatedly, each of them
can have a repeated interaction with the person or organization that provides the
governance, so an honest equilibrium of this kind is logically conceivable. I will
study the operation of such third-party private governance, paying attention to the
question of the intermediary’s honesty, in Chapter 4.
Thus far I have been concerned with the governance of economic interactions,
that is, explicit or implicit contracts between two or more parties, made with mutual
consent. Protection of property rights raises some different issues. Violation of
property rights is a unilateral action taken by the predator; this differs from con-
tractual relationships, which are based on voluntary consent of both or all parties.
Indeed, the owner of a property may not even know the identity of the potential
thief or extortionist. Then the potential victim must take unilateral steps to deter
the potential invader, and to detect and punish him if deterrence fails. The prop-14 1. Economics With and Without the Law
erty owner may try to do this directly, diverting resources from other productive
uses into protection, or he may hire a specialized protector—a private guard or,
again, organized crime. In some countries and at some times the government or its
agents may be the thieves who try to extract as much as they can from the citizens
for their own consumption. The citizens cannot hope to resist the government’s
coercive power with force, but may attempt to hide their assets. Also, the prospect
that the fruit of ones’s efforts will be taken by the government will be a disincentive
to produce or accumulate. I will examine some of these issues in Chapter 5.
Anecdotalevidencesuggeststhatthevariousalternativeinstitutionsofgovernance
can be very effective. Greif (1993, p. 528) found “only a handful of documents
contain[ing]allegationsofmisconduct”inthearchivesofthecorrespondenceamong
Maghribi traders. Bernstein (1992) reports that in the numerous transactions that
occur every year among the 2000 members of the New York Diamond Dealers’
Club and the numerous non-members who trade there, only 30–40 trades result in
a judgment from the arbitration system of the club. Exact ﬁgures are not available
for the total number of transactions or the number of cases where the defendant
refuses to pay the judgment, but a safe guess is that the former is in the hundreds of
thousands and the latter in single digits.
Some may regard this as evidence for fundamental goodness of human nature.
However, the record of failures of other less-well-designed institutions of gover-
nance suggests otherwise. Ostrom (1990, Chapter 5) and Liebcap (1989, Chap-
ters 5, 6) discuss cases of failures to deﬁne and enforce property rights and to solve




economic activity is likely to be hindered by a well-grounded fear of being cheated.
1.7 Some BasicAnalyticalApparatus
The need for governance arises because, in its absence, individuals pursuing their
owninterestswouldgenerateaninferiorequilibriumoutcome. Gametheorystudies
manyinstancesofthis, mostnotablytheprisoner’sdilemma. InthissectionIbrieﬂy
outline three simple games of this kind; in later chapters, some extensions and
variants will be developed and applied in greater detail. Readers who are familiar
with the theory of repeated games can omit this section.
First consider a situation involving two participants, or players in the sense of
game theory. The ﬁrst player begins the game by choosing whether to take a costly
action, here called an investment. Then the second player takes another action that
determineshowtheproductofthisinvestmentissharedbetweenthetwo. Theyhave










Figure 1.1. One-sided prisoner’s dilemma in extensive form.
Table 1.1. One-sided prisoner’s dilemma in normal form.
Player 2
      
Share Hold Up
Invest C1, C2 L1, W2 Player 1
 
Don’t Invest 0, 0 0, 0
with the agreement, both parties will get a positive outcome or game-theoretic
payoff. However, the second player can instead take an opportunistic action, which
will yield him a larger payoff but the ﬁrst player a negative payoff. This is the
famous “hold-up problem” (Klein, Crawford, andAlchian 1978;Williamson 1979).
It is also the situation of medieval merchants studied by Greif (1993, 1994, 1997a,
2000). These merchants had to consign goods to distant agents, who might then
abscond with the goods or the proceeds of the sales.
Figure 1.1 shows the game in its extensive or tree form and Table 1.1 shows
the payoff matrix in the strategic or normal form. If Player 1 does not make the
investment, the status quo prevails. This is chosen as the origin for measuring the
payoffsofbothplayers,sobothget0inthisoutcome. Iftheﬁrstplayerinvestsandthe
secondtakesthesharingaction, theresultingpositivepayoffsaredenotedbyC1 and
C2, respectively. If the ﬁrst player invests and the second engages in opportunistic
hold-up, then the ﬁrst gets a loser’s payoff L1 worse than the status quo (L1 < 0),
whilethesecondgetsawinner’spayoffW2 betterthanthatfromsharing(W2 >C 2).
In the extensive form, the second player’s optimal choice at the second node is
Hold Up (W2 >C 2), and foreseeing this, the ﬁrst player’s optimal action is Don’t
Invest (L1 < 0). This is the only outcome of rollback analysis, or subgame-perfect
equilibrium. And in the normal form, (Don’t Invest, Hold Up) is the only Nash
equilibrium; for any other strategy combination, one of the players wants to deviate
to a different strategy. In this outcome both players get 0, but both would be better
off if they could achieve (Invest, Share). The second player could promise that he
will choose Share, but in the absence of some form of governance, the promise is
not credible.16 1. Economics With and Without the Law
This is like a prisoner’s dilemma except that only the second player has the
opportunity to make an extra private gain, therefore it is often called a one-sided
prisoner’s dilemma. There are two broad approaches to resolving such dilemmas,
although each appears in many different manifestations appropriate for different
circumstances.
First, some method can be found for inﬂicting a direct penalty on the second
player if he chooses Deviate. The state law can do this. The two players agree
before the fact that (Invest, Share) is the better outcome, so they can sign a formal
contract whereby the ﬁrst player undertakes to choose Invest and the second to
respond Share. The court stands ready to enforce this contract, under the threat of
sufﬁciently harsh ﬁnes, and ultimately coercion if that proves necessary. Of course
this requires that any deviations from the agreement can be proved before the court,
or in game-theoretic terminology, are veriﬁable. If state law is absent or ineffective,
private enforcement can perform similar functions to some extent; that possibility




repetition must be inﬁnite or at least indeﬁnite, because in any ﬁxed and ﬁnite
sequence of repetitions, cooperation will unravel from the end. In reality, some
cooperation is observed in cases of ﬁxed repetitions or even single play (Camerer
2003, pp. 45, 46, 221–223), but participants in most commercial transactions would




rate r at which the future is discounted is sufﬁciently low. Consider the following
strategies: Player1’sstrategyis“InvestsolongasPlayer2hasnotchosenHoldUpin
thepast,butstopinvestinginresponsetoanyhistoryofHoldUp.” Player2’sstrategy
is “Share always.” Player 1’s strategy is called a grim-trigger strategy: it threatens
a grim punishment, namely a total breakdown of the relationship, and it is triggered
by any action of Player 2 that departs from his speciﬁed equilibrium strategy.
For this to be an equilibrium, neither player should stand to gain by deviating
from the speciﬁed strategy. The key test is for the second player. If he deviates
once, he gets W2 instead of C2, for an immediate one-time gain of (W2 − C2).
Then the ﬁrst player stops investing, so the second player gets 0 for each subsequent
period, whereas he would have received C2 if he had kept to the speciﬁed strategy
ofcompliance. IfthedeviationistobeunproﬁtabletoPlayer2, theinteresthecould
earn on the up-front one-time gain should not exceed the future loss in each period.1.7. Some Basic Analytical Apparatus 17
That is,
r( W 2 − C2)  C2 . (1.1)
Equivalently,theimmediategain(W2 − C2)shouldnotexceedthecapitalizedvalue
C2/r of the subsequent per-period loss. This reasoning assumes that the deviating
actionisimmediatelydetected, andthefuturecostcomesintheformofapermanent
collapse of the mutually beneﬁcial arrangement. But the idea can be extended to
more complex situations. Detection of a deviation may be less than perfect. In a
large population where one player may meet different potential partners in different
periods, the news of a deviation may be communicated to others with less than
certainty. The population may have people with different preferences or behaviors,
and a player’s action may convey information about his type. Strategies other than
permanent disengagement may be used. However, the general idea of a trade-off
betweenimmediategainsandsubsequentlossesunderliesthemall. Inlaterchapters
I will develop several such applications.
A thematically related but structurally different problem is that of agency. One of
the parties to the transaction (the principal) wants the other (the agent) to take some
action that will bring the principal some gain but require the agent to expend some
cost. The contract speciﬁes how the agent will be compensated for this. But the
contractisconstrainedbyinformation. Someoralloftheagent’sactionandcostand
the principal’s gain may be observable only to the person in question, or observable
to both parties but not provable or veriﬁable to outsiders, or veriﬁable to some
industry experts but not to the general public including ofﬁcials of state law. The
principalandtheagentshareacommoninterestinwritingasefﬁcientacontractasthe
information and institutions allow, but then the agent will behave opportunistically
andpursuehisownbestinteresttotheextentthatthecontractallows. Thislookslike
a one-sided dilemma, but it is better handled using different models and techniques.
I examine some aspects of such agency problems in Chapter 2.
In many transactions, both sides can engage in opportunism, and their game
becomes a conventional (two-sided) prisoner’s dilemma. Gambetta (1993, p. 15)
gives a nice example. A cattle breeder he interviewed in the course of his research
on the Sicilian Maﬁa told him:
When the butcher comes to me to buy an animal, he knows that I want
to cheat him [by giving him a low-quality animal]. But I know that he
wants to cheat me [by reneging on payment].
ThegamehasthefamiliarpayoffmatrixshowninTable1.2. Ilabelthetwoactions
“Comply (with the explicit or implicit terms of the agreement)” and “Deviate (from
the agreement).” In informal discussions, I will sometimes refer to these as honest
behavior and cheating, respectively, but Comply and Deviate better capture the idea18 1. Economics With and Without the Law
Table 1.2. Two-sided prisoner’s dilemma.
Player 2
      
Comply Deviate
Comply C1, C2 L1, W2 Player 1
 
Deviate W1, L2 D1, D2
formally.2 Each player fares best when he chooses Deviate while the other chooses
Comply, and worst when he chooses Comply while the other chooses Deviate.
Between these extremes, the payoff is higher when both choose Comply than when
both choose Deviate. Thus W1 >C 1 >D 1 >L 1 and W2 >C 2 >D 2 >L 2.
Of course formalization requires simpliﬁcation of reality. The single action
labeled Deviate may in fact stand for a complex set of possibilities. Indeed, the true
game of opportunism may consist of seeking and ﬁnding actions that are advan-
tageous to oneself, not merely choosing one from a set of already known actions.
Another subtlety arises if a formal contract does not constitute the true implicit
understanding between the parties, with the result that “Comply” means “comply
withthetruespiritofthecontract,”while“Deviate”means“reverttotheletterofthe
formalcontract,”asinawork-to-rule. Althoughformalizationhidessuchsubtleties,
it has its own advantage of giving us a deeper understanding of the mechanisms or
processesoftheparties’interactions. Thereforeformalanalysisshouldbedone,and
then interpreted in a broader and more ﬂexible manner. That is what I shall attempt.
If the game is played once—or a ﬁxed, ﬁnite, and known number of times—each
player’sdominantstrategyisalwaystoplayDeviate. Theresultingequilibriumwith
payoffs (D1,D 2) is worse for both than what they would get if both chose Comply
(acted honestly), but that is not achievable given the temptation of each to choose
Deviate (cheat).
If the game is repeated inﬁnitely or indeﬁnitely often, the good outcome where
both choose Comply can be sustained using grim-trigger strategies for both players,
stipulatingpermanentdeviationbybothplayersaftertheoccurrenceofevenasingle
deviation by either. When each expects the other to follow this strategy, Player 1
does not want to deviate if the interest r( W 1 − C1) he could earn on his immediate
gain (W1 − C1) from choosing Deviate does not exceed the reduction in his payoffs
for each subsequent period, (C1 − D1). That is,
r( W 1 − C1)  C1 − D1 , (1.2)
2Cooperate and Defect are commonly used in game theory, but I want to avoid “Cooperate” because
that invites confusion with a “cooperative game” in the technical sense, where the actions are jointly
agreedandalsojointlyimplemented. Therethesubstantiveissueistheprocessofreachinganagreement,
and deviations are impossible once an agreement has been reached. By contrast, my focus is on how
to achieve good or cooperative outcomes despite the fact that the players choose actions individually
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Table 1.3. Two-sided prisoner’s dilemma with option not to play.
Player 2
      
Play, Comply Play, Deviate Don’t Play





Play, Deviate W1, L2 D1, D2 0, 0
Don’t Play 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0
and similarly for Player 2. In later chapters I will discuss several variants and
elaborations of this game; a general theoretical treatment can be found in Osborne
and Rubinstein (1994, Chapter 8), and a survey of the literature in Pearce (1992).
The standard prisoner’s dilemma game assumes that both players have already
decided to play. However, in many real-life situations the players have the option
of not playing, if they calculate that their payoffs in the resulting equilibrium will
be less than what they could get in the available alternative opportunities. This is a
two-stage game. At the ﬁrst stage each player decides whether to play the dilemma




chosen so as to make each player’s payoff from his outside alternative equal to zero.
The other payoffs are as before. Table 1.3 shows the payoff matrix of the game.
The outcome where both players choose “Don’t Play” is always a Nash equilib-
riumofthisgame,becauseifoneischoosingthisaction,theothercannotgetahigher
payoff by choosing anything else. But there can be other equilibria, depending on
the signs of D1 and D2, that is, whether it is better to play the game even if both
are going to Deviate. If D1 is negative, then there is an equilibrium where Player 1
chooses not to play, and Player 2 chooses Play and Deviate. If D2 is negative, there
is a similar equilibrium with the players interchanged. If both D1 and D2 are nega-
tive, both of these are equilibria, so there are three equilibria in all. However, since
both have to choose to play for the game to take place, the outcome in all these new
equilibria is that the game is not played and both players end up with their outside
alternative, so these are distinctions without a difference.
If both D1 and D2 are positive, we ﬁnd a genuinely different second Nash equi-
librium, where both choose Play and Deviate. The existence of two equilibria is
often a nuisance, but it can be a help in sustaining cooperation in repeated games.
Speciﬁcally,evenwithaﬁniteandknownnumberofrepetitions,cooperationmaybe
sustainable for all but the last few plays. This can be achieved using strategies that
specify starting out with the (C1,C 2) outcome, and switching to the (D1,D 2) out-
come in those last few plays, but switching immediately to the (0,0) outcome if
either player deviates at one of the earlier plays where compliance was indicated.20 1. Economics With and Without the Law
Benoit and Krishna (1985) develop the general theory of such games; I will have
occasion to use a simple speciﬁc instance of it in Chapter 3.
The situations studied in each of the following three chapters differ in their spec-
iﬁcation of players, information, and available strategies. Therefore the models
above are not directly applicable merely by a special interpretation of the actions
and the payoffs. While they share the schematic structure of the dilemma games,
each needs its own reformulation.
All of them have one restrictive feature requiring discussion. All are models
of repeated games under stationary conditions. Each can describe how an institu-
tion of governance functions, or how two institutions can coexist, once all traders’
expectations and actions have adjusted to this fact. However, the process whereby a
society changes from one institution to another is dynamic. When I say something
about this dynamics, I have interpreted the models beyond their formal results, for
example drawing some dynamic inferences from comparative static analysis.
Dynamic games are far more complex than repeated games, and require different
approaches and techniques, for example evolutionary theory, stochastic processes,




My focus is on the problems of information and enforcement in speciﬁc contexts:
veriﬁability and its cost in Chapter 2; localization of communication in Chapter 3;
and simultaneous games played between each trader and the intermediary in Chap-
ter 4. To treat these details adequately, I have simpliﬁed the dynamics. Others
make the opposite choice: they represent the game played each period in a sim-
ple or schematic way and focus on the dynamic process. Young (1998, Chapter 9)
ﬁnds conditions under which the participants in the society will eventually choose
efﬁcient contracts. But their actions are limited to offering contracts; no cheating
occurs within a contract after it is chosen. For example, in his “marriage game,” the
prospective partners may both offer a contract under which they will share control,
but neither is then allowed to renege and attempt to seize control. Thus issues of
interest to Lawlessness and Economics do not arise. Aoki (2001) is concerned with
many of the same issues of governance as I am. In his modeling of dynamics in
Chapters 7–10, he sets up a general taxonomic scheme, and then interprets several
examples of empirical studies in its categories. But he does not go into the details
of information or communication in each game, nor does he examine how these
aspects will affect the dynamics of each speciﬁc case.
Future research may achieve a synthesis that has both the dynamics and the fuller
speciﬁcation of the underlying games, and feedbacks between these two aspects. In1.8. Approach of the Book 21
the meantime, I hope that the available approaches serve as complementary inputs
to our thinking about the issues.
1.8 Approach of the Book
In the previous three sections, I have outlined the questions I will discuss in the
rest of the book, and something of the methods I will use for that purpose. Here I
describe and discuss my approach in greater detail.
Each of the following chapters takes up one set of issues within the range of
Lawlessness and Economics. Each chapter begins with a selective overview of the
literature. Theexistingbodyofresearchisnotonlymulti-disciplinarybutalsomulti-
methodology. There is some statistical empirical work, and much more descriptive
work consisting of case studies and ethnography. Theoretical research has lagged
behind the empirical and descriptive, although the gap is closing rapidly.
This assessment may surprise some who have followed the literature on the New
Institutional Economics. For example, Alston, Eggertson, and North (1996, p. 1)
say that
the ﬁeld is long on theoretical analysis but short on empirical work. It
is probably true that the stock of knowledge would grow faster if the
new institutionalists put more emphasis on empirical work.
The difference arises, as usual, due to our different interpretations of the word “the-
ory.” Agoodgeneralconceptualschemeclearlyexists,andEggertson(1996)depicts
itinadiagramofboxesandarrowsshowingconnectionsbetweeninstitutions, orga-
nizations, contracts, and so on. However, I believe that if theory is to be useful in
improvingourunderstandingofspeciﬁcinstitutionsandhelpingusdesignorreform
existing organizations and institutions, theoretical analysis must go beyond general
schemata, and develop more detailed models of the speciﬁc situations and problems
that concern us. Such modeling is expanding fast, but still has some catching up to
do. That is where I hope to make some original contribution in this book.
Empiricalresearch,especiallycasestudiesandethnography,andtheoreticalmod-
eling have different and complementary merits and drawbacks. Case studies give
us rich, detailed description of the facts of each situation. Econometric research
establishes correlations among variables across countries or over time. However,
both approaches leave basic questions of cause and effect implicit or unexamined.
Theoretical modeling more explicitly sets up hypotheses about causes and effects,
and examines all the logical consequences of the set of hypotheses under consid-
eration. It brings together some key aspects that are common to many situations
and cases, and gives a sharper and deeper understanding of forces and mechanisms
that operate. This improved understanding is what justiﬁes theoretical modeling. I
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formal models are “genuine coin of the realm, sir. With a dollar of this you can buy
more than with ten dollars of talk” (Hammett 1930, Chapter 18).
However, for reasons of tractability, such work must abstract from many of the
rich details of speciﬁc contexts. Thus each theoretical model selects for its in-depth
analysis only a narrow subset of the range of facts and situations known to us from
empirical and case studies. The aim of theory should be to construct a collection of
modelsthatissufﬁcientlysmalltoberememberedandused,andcoversasufﬁciently
large portion of the spectrum of facts. Overall understanding of the rich arrays of
facts will best be achieved by interpreting them in the light of an appropriate model
(or a few pertinent models) from this set, and by compiling and comparing the
insights they generate. What about one universal model to cover all the facts?
Neoclassical economic theorists who admire the generality and the beauty of the
Arrow–Debreumodelofcompetitiveequilibriummaywishtoattemptsimilargrand
theorizing everywhere. But that has not proved to be a fruitful approach in other
areas of economics. In the ﬁeld of Industrial Organization, for example, theoretical
progress has come from a toolkit of several models. I believe the same is likely to
be true in the emerging ﬁeld of Lawlessness and Economics. Only a small number
of models covering only small patches of the territory have been constructed so far,
but that simply means that there is a lot of room for further modeling.
How should one judge such models? I suggest two criteria. First, a model should
do more than explain just the simplest and most obvious motivating facts that led
one to build that model, it should offer a sharper or deeper understanding of them in
terms of more basic economic principles or by connecting them to other seemingly
unrelated facts. Second, a theoretical model should not merely reproduce as results
the factual observations of case studies that the model was constructed to explain
in the ﬁrst place; it should yield some new results or hypotheses that can then be
compared with other facts. Conversely, case study or empirical research should not
treat each case as a mere narrative or description of an isolated situation; it should
attempt to place it in an overall framework of other cases and theories. Ultimately
progress must come from a dialogue and feedback between the different modes, not
from any one of them on its own.
My comparative advantage is in theoretical modeling, so I spend more time and
space on that. By way of background and motivation for the theory to come, I begin
each chapter with a selective look at the literature—concepts, descriptions and case
studies of some institutions and organizations, and surveys. Then I pick up some
aspects of the ﬁndings of the case studies, and construct one or more theoretical
models of them. I attempt to live up to the self-imposed criterion of asking the
models to deliver more than just the facts they were rigged to explain; sometimes I
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In the concluding section of each chapter I assess where the modeling of that
chapter gets us, what it leaves out, and what the prospects are for future research.
In each chapter the readers will ﬁnd several interesting empirical observations that
my models do not touch at all. I do not apologize for that. This book is at best an
interim stock-taking of a ﬁeld in its infancy. The omitted dimensions need other
models. Readers should take the frequent and large gaps and ﬂaws I point out as
challenges for further research, and an invitation to join the band of lemmings who
form the ﬁeld of Lawlessness and Economics. Very ﬁttingly, no property rights to
ideas are staked out or enforced in this ﬁeld; everyone is free to take any idea and
to run with it.